NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s don’t-poke-the-bear approach to dealing with U.S. President Donald Trump was on full display Monday as he threaded his way around questions about the possible introduction of European troops in Greenland.
There were reports over the weekend that a group of countries — led by the U.K. and Germany — are discussing a military presence on the Arctic island as a hedge against American annexation.
Trump’s approach of doing something about Greenland “whether they like it or not” and threats of using military force against the semi-autonomous Danish territory — whether it breaks NATO or not — have turned the spotlight on issues that both the alliance and United States have long overlooked.
Rutte tacitly acknowledged that Europeans are holding discussions about improved Arctic security. But he downplayed those conversations, saying they’re simply an extension of talks which began midway through last year at the request of seven allied Arctic nations, including the United States.
“We have to work together to make sure that the Arctic stays safe and currently we are discussing the next step to do that, how to make sure that we give practical follow-up on those discussions,” Rutte said.
“How to ensure that as an alliance we do everything collectively and through our individual allies to make sure that the Arctic stays safe, as we all agree that that has to be a priority.”
The idea appears to be to convince Trump that NATO is as interested as he is in beefing up the defences of the island territory.

It’s an interesting turn given that Arctic security has been on the back burner for both the United States and NATO for decades.
Having said that, a noticeable attitude shift toward the region began in Washington in 2022 and only accelerated under the second Trump administration.
While Canada has put increased policy focus and pledged billions in additional spending in the Far North, the Western military alliance overall has been caught flat-footed by increased security pressure from the U.S.
For example, NATO has no official policy on the Arctic, nor a command devoted to the region, noted a recent report by the Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies.
“Over the past 15 years, NATO officials have dismissed ideas of developing a dedicated body to oversee Arctic projects,” said a June 2024 report, which noted that over the years leaders of the alliance have believed that putting emphasis on the Far North would undermine NATO’s core mission of defending Europe.
As late as 2020, the idea of a separate command was publicly dismissed.
NATO does maintain a joint force command in Norfolk, Va., which has a wide remit that includes the United Kingdom and Norway, Greenland and Iceland, but some experts believe that it’s a poor substitute for a dedicated command.
Until just recently, the Pentagon lumped Greenland inside the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), but in June, the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) took over responsibility for the island.
According to an essay in the long-standing online publication Small Wars Journal, the move was another sign Greenland is seen by Washington as part of the U.S. homeland defence network.
For years, within the alliance, the idea of a greater Arctic presence and security footprint was a non-starter.
“Arguments against having an increased NATO presence in the Arctic also highlight that a strong NATO presence in the region would do nothing but aggravate Russia, which already sees the alliance as hostile and considers its encroachment close to Russian borders an existential threat,” said the Arctic Institute report.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has taken more of an interest in the region, holding additional, larger exercises. But those drills have been focused on defending Europe, not North America.
Trump recently described the Danish defences in Greenland as “two dog sleds.”
The government in Copenhagen has acknowledged it has not invested enough, but pointed to recently increased military spending for the island.
Trump’s rhetoric ignores not only the existing U.S. military presence in Greenland, but Washington’s own lack of planning, negotiation and investment in the island’s early warning radars, which have been an important line of defence for North America against the possibility of nuclear attack by Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles for decades.
The online U.S. publication Defence News reported last fall that the radar site at the Americans’ Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland is vulnerable to attack by hypersonic missiles, which can neither be detected nor shot down.

Late last week, Russia fired its hypersonic Oreshnik missile at Ukraine, a strike that hit the city of Lviv, close to the Ukrainian border with Poland.
Troy Bouffard, director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience at the University of Alaska, told Defense News that the U.S. should have a standing integrated air and missile defence system in Greenland. Such a system could plug into the NORAD network.
Over the last couple of years, there’s been talk in the academic community that the Danes should be allowed to join the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).
While it is not front and centre and certainly no pretext for annexation, separately and significantly, U.S. defence analysts have been warning for the last few years that Greenland’s drive toward possible independence from Denmark could complicate the Arctic defence picture.
The Rand Corporation, the U.S. policy think-tank, published a research paper almost five years ago that said the independence movements in the Faroe Islands, Scotland and Greenland deserved the attention of policymakers in Washington.
“Should any or all of these nations achieve independence, it is not clear that they will choose to join NATO, or even that they will allow alliance forces to operate from their territory,” said the research commentary published in July 2021, on the heels of the NATO summit in Brussels that year.
“Perhaps they will conclude that alliance membership or involvement somehow impinges on their new sovereignty, or that strict neutrality would improve their security while reducing the need for defence spending. Some citizens might simply be embittered enough towards their former governments that they do not want to join an alliance that includes them.”
WATCH | A closer look at the Greenland issue:
What’s with Trump’s obsession with Greenland? | About That
U.S. president-elect Donald Trump has long been fascinated with owning and controlling Greenland, spanning from his interest in buying the country in 2019, to his recent refusal to rule out taking it by military force. Andrew Chang explores four potential reasons why Trump calls ownership of Greenland ‘an absolute necessity.’
Images provided by Getty Images, Reuters and The Canadian Press.
During a meeting with oil executives over Venezuela last week, Trump played up the importance of Greenland’s mineral wealth in his grand scheme.
He has accused Denmark of leaving the territory vulnerable to influence by China and Russia.
What Trump has failed to acknowledge is that Greenland has for a long time been trying to attract U.S. and Western investment in its critical minerals sector without much success.
Last spring, Naaja Nathanielsen, Greenland’s minister for business and mineral resources, warned Western disinterest may force the territory to seek partnerships with China.
A Chinese company did establish a large rare earths mine on the island, but it is largely idle because of environmental concerns.
A report last week by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies noted Greenland has two large deposits of rare earth minerals on the southern tip of the island: Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.
“For years, China has attempted to establish a foothold in Greenland through infrastructure investments, but no Chinese investment has come to fruition due to geopolitical concerns,” said the report.
“In the last 10 years, China has ventured to invest in Greenland’s airports, an abandoned naval station and a satellite ground station, but its ambitions have been largely stalled and curtailed by U.S. and Danish stakeholders.”
Rare earth deposits are commonly found alongside uranium and that has led to fierce political opposition, including the passage of legislation by the territory that obstructed further mine licensing by banning the development of deposits with a uranium concentration over 100 parts per million.
Article source: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/arctic-nato-us-denmark-greenland-defence-9.7042833?cmp=rss